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In this paper we study the economic evolution between 1960 and 1995 of two states in India
— Maharashtra and West Bengal. During this period West Bengal, which was one of the
two richest states in India in 1960, has gone from a relative per capita income of about
100 percent of Maharashtra, to a relative income of around 60 percent. Our diagnostic
analysis reveals that a large part of the blame for West Bengal’s development woes can
be attributed to: (a) low aggregate productivity (b) poorly functioning labor markets and
sectoral misallocations. We ﬁnd that sectoral productivity and labor market allocation
wedges were strongly correlated with political developments in West Bengal, namely the
increasing vote share of the leftist parties.
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When India gained independence from Britain in 1947 the two richest states in the country
were Maharashtra and West Bengal. Till 1960 their relative standing remained unchanged.
However, by 1995 West Bengal had regressed to about the middle of the income distribution
across Indian states while its per capita income had declined to about 60 percent of Maha-
rashtra. In this paper we ﬁrst document the speciﬁcs of this dynamic evolution and then
attempt a statistical decomposition of the data patterns. Our diagnostic analysis reveals
that a large part of the blame for West Bengal’s development woes can be attributed to:
(a) low aggregate productivity; and (b) labor market distortions — some factors depressed
the marginal product of labor in the manufacturing sector in West Bengal. We ﬁnd that
while the greater political power of the left (with its strong rural and labor constituencies)
in West Bengal were correlated with productivity and labor market distortions, they did
not translate into productivity gains for agriculture or into a reduction in the incidence of
poverty (relative to Maharashtra).
Comparing the sectoral evolution of West Bengal and Maharashtra during this period
reveals that two major diﬀerences between the states were their performances in the agri-
cultural and manufacturing sectors. Manufacturing’s share of output was almost identical
across the two states in 1960. By 1995 however, while the output share of manufacturing
in Maharashtra increased, in West Bengal it declined from 22 percent to 15 percent. In
other words, West Bengal experienced a process of de-industrialization during this period.
In agriculture, both states started out with output shares of around 40 percent in 1960.
Between 1960 and 1995 agriculture’s share of output declined in both states. However, the
agricultural decline in West Bengal was half the size of the decline in Maharashtra. In the
1other major sector, services, the performance of the states was similar with the output share
of services rising from 32 percent in 1960 to about 45 percent by 1995.1
Motivated by this evidence on the asymmetric sectoral evolution in West Bengal and
Maharashtra, we conduct a diagnostic exercise on the two states. In particular, we analyze
the data through the prizm of a multisector neoclassical growth model. The primary goal of
this exercise is to identify the margins that may have been responsible for the performance
disparity. We ﬁnd that about 2/3 of the output diﬀerence in the manufacturing and services
sectors between the two states in 1995 can be attributed to diﬀerences in sectoral total factor
productivity. The rest is attributable to the labor market wedges. The labor market wedges
show that marginal product of labor in the manufacturing sector in West Bengal were too low.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that agricultural productivity in West Bengal relative to Maharashtra
actually declined between 1960 and 1995. The declining relative agricultural productivity
was oﬀset by an increase in the relative agricultural share of the labor force during this
period. This positive agricultural employment eﬀect oﬀset the relative productivity decline
thereby arresting the decline in agricultural’s share of output in West Bengal.
Guided by the diagnostic results, we investigate a couple of alternative explanations for
the diﬀerence in the relative performance of West Bengal. We ﬁnd that our measured wedges
are strongly correlated with political developments in West Bengal, namely the increasing
v o t es h a r eo ft h el e f t i s tp a r t i e so v e rt h el a s t3 5y e a r s . T h ev o t es h a r eo ft h el e f t i s tp a r t i e s ,
in turn, is positively correlated with the incidence of industrial action, strikes, lockouts etc..
The incidence of industrial action in West Bengal (measured by the ratios of days lost to
days worked) increased sharply in the mid-1960s and thereafter has remained at about three
1Agriculture, manufacturing and services comprise about 90 percent of output of these two states during
this period.
2times the level in Maharashtra. This suggests tou st h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt he bargaining power
of labor in West Bengal may have been a signiﬁcant ingredient in the relative decline of West
Bengal.
We ﬁnd the results interesting on two counts. First, we are unable to ﬁnd a similar
example of two regions within the same country, who were jointly at the top of the income
distribution at some point in time, exhibiting such a marked diﬀerence in economic perfor-
mance over a 35 year period. Indeed, even looking at the cross-country income data it is
hard to ﬁnd similar cases. As pointed out by Kehoe and Ruhl (2003), there are a couple
of cases like New Zealand and Switzerland which showed 40 percent declines in per capita
incomes relative to the USA between 1960 and 2000. However, New Zealand (4 million
people in 2000) and Switzerland (7 million) are tiny when compared with West Bengal (80
million) and Maharashtra (97 million). Second, the correlation of the measured wedges
in sectoral labor allocation conditions and sectoral productivity with the vote share of the
leftist parties point to promising avenues for quantifying the eﬀects of aggressive pro-labor
industrial work rules as well as state sanctioned industrial action.
Our paper is closely related to some recent work by Besley and Burgess (2003) [2].
[2] use the same data to study the evolution of the manufacturing sector across Indian
states. Based on a detailed study of amendments to labor regulations in diﬀerent states,
[2] construct an index which classiﬁes each state as being either pro-labor, neutral or pro-
employer. They ﬁnd that pro-worker legislation reduced growth of manufacturing output,
investment and employment. Moreover, pro-labor regulation also slowed down the rate of
poverty reduction. While our results are consistent with the ﬁndings of [2], we should note
that their index classiﬁes both West Bengal and Maharashtra as being pro-labor. Hence,
their index is not directly informative about the diﬀerent development patterns of these two
3states.2
The paper is also related to a recent paper by Banerjee et al (2002) [1]. The focus of the
work of [1] was on compiling a list of policy initiatives which could be used by policymakers
to redress the economic problems that West Bengal has faced in recent years. In order
to suggest possible remedies the authors also attempted some diagnostics on West Bengal.
Two of their conclusions regarding West Bengal’s recent history are related to our work and
hence merit some review. First, [1] suggest that the performance of the agricultural sector
in West Bengal had been excellent. Second, [1] suggest that the West Bengal’s performance
in reducing the incidence of poverty has been outstanding. We take issue with both these
conclusions.
Our examination of the data suggests that the conclusions of [1] are a function of the
initial date they choose to evaluate the time series evidence. As was pointed out above,
agricultural productivity in West Bengal relative to Maharashtra declined between 1960 and
1995. However, if one only focuses on the period since 1980 then there was an improvement in
relative agricultural productivity. Similarly, relative to Maharashtra, the number of people
under the poverty line both in rural and urban areas of West Bengal remained unchanged
between 1960 and 1995 even though there was a deﬁnite improvement in the relative poverty
numbers post-1980 period. Hence, during the entire period 1960-95, we do not ﬁnd any
improvement on either of these margins in West Bengal.
Lastly, we ﬁnd that human capital attainment has suﬀered signiﬁcantly due to the last
three decades stagnation in West Bengal. We ﬁnd that across all population age groups the
2As further support for our diagnosis of the labor market being the problem in West Bengal, [2] report
that "West Bengal was also a state which had the greatest body of pro-labor regulation passed in state
legislature."
4share of the population with graduate, post-graduate, and technical degrees has declined in
West Bengal. This is particularly striking given that West Bengal started out as one of the
most educated states in India. The large decline in educational attainment levels of the
20-24 age group also suggests that labor productivity in West Bengal may remain low for
sustained periods in the immediate future even if investment in physical capital picks up in
the coming years.
In the next section we describe the data and document the relative evolution of the two
states. In Section 3 we use a standard neoclassical growth model to conduct some diagnostic
tests on the data while Section 4 evaluates some potential explanations for the diagnostic
results. Section 5 discusses some ancillary issues while the last section concludes.
2D a t a P a t t e r n s
Our data mostly comes from the detailed India data set put together by the Economic and
Political Weekly. This data covers both state-level sectoral and aggregate data. The data
for the manufacturing sector in the two states essentially relies on the Annual Survey of
Industries for various years. We also have sectoral employment data from the Census of
India which is conducted every ten years. The electoral data that we use comes from the
Election Commission of India.
Figure 1 shows the state-wise distribution of per capita incomes across India in 1960
and 1994. The ﬁgure expresses the per capita income of all states relative to Maharashtra
w h i c hw a st h es e c o n dr i c h e s ts t a t ei n1 9 6 0 . T h eg r a p hm a k e sc l e a rt h r e ef a c t s . F i r s t ,
in 1960 West Bengal was the third richest state in India with a per capita income that
was almost 100 percent of Maharashtra. Second, by 1994 West Bengal had regressed to
about the middle of the distribution with a per capita income that was about 60 percent of
5Figure 1: Income distribution across Indian states






















Maharashtra. Meanwhile Maharashtra remained the second richest state in 1994. Third,
the fall in West Bengal’s relative income between 1960 and 1995 was the largest proportional
change in absolute value across all the states.
In Figure 2 we plot the time series evolution of the per capita state domestic product
(SDP) of Maharashtra, West Bengal, and the rest of India. The plot shows that the decline
in the relative per capita income of West Bengal was due to the slowdown in growth in West
Bengal rather than a growth pick-up in Maharashtra. The plot reveals that during this
period West Bengal’s per capita SDP converged toward the average per capita income of the
rest of India while Maharashtra maintained its income gap relative to the rest of India.
It is worth pointing out that the population dynamics in West Bengal and Maharashtra
followed very similar paths. Thus, West Bengal’s population has been roughly 87% of

















































Real Net State Domestic Product per Capita
Maharashtra throughout the sample period. Figure 3 shows the population evolution of the
two states.
A fall in income of this magnitude in such a short period of time by a leading economy
is rare. To put this in perspective, in Figure 4 we plot the cross-country distribution of per
capita income relative to the USA in 1960 and 2000. As ﬁrst pointed out by Kehoe and
Ruhl (2002), the Penn World Tables show that two countries which suﬀered similar declines
(40%) in per capita income as West Bengal were New Zealand and Switzerland. However,
what makes the case of West Bengal stand out is its sheer size. While the populations
of New Zealand and Switzerland in 2000 are 7.2 million and 3.9 million, the corresponding
populations of West Bengal and Maharashtra are 80.2 million and 96.7 million. Hence, the
relative decline in West Bengal aﬀected the living standards of a populace which was twenty
times larger than New Zealand.







































8We next turn to a sectoral assessment of the relative performance of the two states. In
particular, we are interested in determining whether the poor performance of West Bengal
w a sd r i v e np r i m a r i l yb yp o o rp e r f o r m a n c ei ns o m es p e c i ﬁcs e c t o ro rw a si tb r o a db a s e d .
Accordingly, in Figure 5 we compare the sectoral shares of SDP across the two states. The
ﬁgure reveals that while agriculture’s share of output declined in both states, the decline was
much more pronounced in Maharashtra. The second major diﬀerence between the states was
in the evolution of the manufacturing sector. In Maharashtra manufacturing increased its
share of output between 1960 and 1995, while West Bengal experienced a de-industrialization
during this period with manufacturing’s share of output declining from 20 percent in 1960
to 15 percent in 1995. On the other hand, the share of services in output increased similarly
in both states.
The impact of the de-industrialization in West Bengal on the evolution of its per capita
income between 1960 and 1995 is best illustrated by a counterfactual exercise. The ratio
of manufacturing output in West Bengal to Maharashtra declined from 0.78 in 1960 to 0.34
in 1995. If the manufacturing sector in West Bengal had just held its position relative to
Maharashtra during this period at 0.78, the additional output produced would have increased
West Bengal’s per capita SDP in 1995 by 20 percent. This would have raised West Bengal’s
per capita SDP in 1995 to 76 percent of Maharashtra instead of the actual 63 percent. Most
strikingly, West Bengal would have been the fourth richest state in the country in 1995.
In order to get a closer view of the manufacturing sectors in the two states we now turn
to a more detailed study of the manufacturing sectors in West Bengal and Maharashtra. We
do this by analyzing survey data on the registered manufacturing sector. The advantage
of the survey data on registered manufacturing is that it contains detailed data on capital,
investment and employment. We should note that registered manufacturing comprises, on
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average, 80 percent of the manufacturing sectors in West Bengal and Maharashtra.
Figures 6-8 show the evolution of manufacturing output as well as manufacturing output
per unit labor, investment and capital, hours worked and employment in West Bengal relative
to Maharashtra over the period 1960-95. The uniﬁed message of these ﬁg u r e si st h a ts t a r t i n g
from an initial position of being on par with Maharashtra, there was a secular decline in
both output and inputs in the manufacturing sector in West Bengal throughout the period.
The picture is probably most dramatic for investment and installed capital. For both these
series, West Bengal was actually ahead of Maharashtra in 1960 but had declined to about
40% of Maharashtra by 1995. Clearly, owners of capital let the installed capital depreciate
over time without investing in new capital during this period.
The last issue that we investigate is the evolution of the industrial composition of the
manufacturing sector. In particular, it could be the case that a sector which experienced
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12a contraction in both states drove the dynamics in West Bengal because manufacturing in
West Bengal was concentrated in that sector. In Figure 9 we plot for both states the sectoral
outputs in 1979 and 1995. Note that the sectoral outputs for each state are expressed relative
to output of the largest manufacturing sector in that state in 1960. For West Bengal, the
largest sector was Jute while in Maharashtra it was Chemicals. Figure 9 shows that a
compositional shift cannot account for the disparity in manufacturing across the two states.
In West Bengal the sectoral composition of manufacturing remained relatively unchanged
between 1979-95 while this composition did undergo some change in Maharashtra. In fact
Maharashtra was very highly concentrated in textiles at the beginning of the period. But
the textile industry suﬀered a big contraction in the 1970s and 1980s which induced a shift
in the sectoral composition in Maharashtra.3
3 Model-based Diagnostics
Having documented the key features of the post-independence development paths of West
Bengal and Maharashtra, we now turn to some diagnostic exercises to determine the poten-
tial margins which contributed the most to the actual data patterns. In this exercise we are
guided by the recently popularized methods of Cole and Ohanian (2002, 2004) and Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2004). We follow these authors in using the neoclassical growth
model as a diagnostic device to isolate the areas/markets that are the likely source of the dis-
crepancy between the two states. This diagnostic method consists of computing the wedges
in the ﬁrst order conditions of the neoclassical model and determining the conditions that
deviated the most from optimality. The diﬀerence between our exercise and the exercises
3Our data on the various sub-sectors within manufacturing goes back only till 1979. This prevents us
from extending the sectoral comparison back to 1960.



























14i nt h ep a p e r sm e n t i o n e da b o v ei st h a tw ea r eg o i n gt os t u d yt h ed a t at h r o u g ht h ep r i z mo f
a multi-sector version of the neoclassical model rather than the standard one sector growth
model. This reﬂects the fact that our review of the broad data patterns in the two states
suggests that diﬀerential sectoral evolutions in the two states may be a crucial ingredient in
understanding the overall performance diﬀerential between Bengal and Maharashtra.
Consider an economy (country) composed of a number of constituent states. Each state
has four sectors of production — a ﬁnal good sector, and three intermediate goods sectors:
agriculture, manufacturing and services. Each state is assumed to be small and takes as
exogenous the prices of goods that are tradable across states within the country. The
manufacturing and agricultural goods are assumed to be freely tradeable while the services
and ﬁnal goods are non-tradable. The agriculture, manufacturing and services goods are
inputs into a production technology which produces a non-traded ﬁnal good that can both
be consumed as well as converted into storable capital.
The representative household in each state maximizes the present discounted value of
lifetime utility with instantaneous utility being given by
u(c,l)=l o gc + ψlog(¯ l − l)
where c is consumption per person, l is labor supply (hours worked), and ¯ l is the total
endowment of labor hours available to the agent. The optimization is done subject to the
budget constraint:







where k is the capital stock per person, δ is the depreciation rate while wi i st h ew a g er a t e
in sector i (i = a,m,s). r is the interest rate while Π,Πa,Πm,and Πs are dividends from
15ﬁnal goods, agriculture, manufacturing, and service sector ﬁrms. T = paTa +pmTm denotes
unilateral transfers of the tradable agricultural and manufacturing goods from the rest of
t h ew o r l d . N o t et h a tw ea r eu s i n gt h eﬁnal good as the numeraire good so that all prices
are expressed in units of the ﬁnal good. In addition to the budget constraint, households
also face the time endowment constraint: lm + la + la = l. The representative household’s
problem leads to two ﬁrst-order conditions:
χ
ct










wat =wmt = wst = wt (3)
These are standard optimality conditions with equation (1) determining the optimal consumption-
leisure choice while (2) is the intertemporal Euler equation determining savings. Equation
(3) shows that wages must be equalized across sectors since labor reallocation across sectors
is costless.
















where yj is total output of good j = a,m,s while y is the output of the ﬁnal good. ˆ yj is the
total input of good j = a,m,s in producing the ﬁnal good. Note that usage of goods a and
m in any state can exceed total production of the good in that state since these intermediate
16can be traded. xj (j = a,m,s) is the level of the labor augmenting technology factor. We
are assuming here that the agriculture and service sectors are Ricardian in that they only
use labor to produce while the manufacturing sector uses both labor and capital. This
modelling assumption reﬂects a major data limitations in tat we do not have capital use
data for any sector aside from manufacturing.
Perfectly competitive ﬁrms in each sector maximize proﬁt sw h i c ha r eg i v e nb y :
Πt =yt − patˆ yat − pmtˆ ymt − pstˆ yst
Π
a
t =patyat − watlat
Π
m
t =pmtymt − wmtlmt − rtkt
Π
s
t =pstyst − wstlst
Final goods ﬁrms choose ˆ yat, ˆ ymt and ˆ yst to maximize Π subject to the production technology







(1 − γ − θ)yt
ˆ yat
=pat (6)
Firms in the manufacturing sector choose k and lm to maximize proﬁts subject to the pro-









The ﬁrst equation above is the optimal capital-use condition while the second condition
determines optimal labor use. Lastly, agriculture and service sector ﬁrms choose labor to










Noting that the services good and the ﬁnal good are non-traded, the market clearing con-
ditions for these goods dictates that their domestic consumption must equal their domestic
production. Hence, we must have
ct + kt+1 =yt +( 1− δ)kt
ˆ yst =yst
where the ﬁrst equation is the market clearing condition for the ﬁnal good while the second
equation is the corresponding condition for the services good.
We also have a balanced trade condition which follows from the budget constraints and
market clearing conditions. For each state we must have
pat(yat + Tat − ˆ yat)=pmt(ˆ ymt − ymt − Tmt)
Hence, total exports have to equal total imports period by period. Recall that a hat over a
variable indicates the use of that variable in the state while variables without hats indicate
the level of production of the relevant good in the state.
Substituting in the market clearing condition for services into equation (4), one can solve
for the state-speciﬁc price of services, ps. In turn, one can use ps along with the zero proﬁt




















I nt h el i g h to ft h ea b o v e ,w ec a nu s et h eﬁrst order conditions (1)-(3), and (7)-(10) to derive






























































Equations (11)-(19) hold for each state under study at each date. Moreover, given our data,
we can measure all the variables in each of these nine equations for each state and date.
Before proceeding further a couple of explanations for our modelling choices are in order.
A number of speciﬁc modelling assumptions are driven by the availability of data (or lack
thereof). In particular, we do not have non-labor input use by any sector other than
manufacturing. This forced us to model the production technology of agriculture and
services as using only labor. Also, we do not have state level time series data on savings
19or investment. Our investment data is only for the manufacturing sector. Lastly, while
we have do have data on the relative price of agriculture to manufacturing (pa/pm)a tt h e
aggregate India level, we do not have corresponding data on the price of services. This
forced us to impute the price data from the available quantity data. Unfortunately, for each
state we only have production data by sector but no consumption data by sector. Moreover,
even though there is obviously trade across states in a number of commodities, we do not
have cross-state trade data. This necessitated the modelling of the services and ﬁnal goods
as non-traded goods.
Given the consumption data and the output of services, we can use equations (11) and
(12) to impute the equilibrium prices ps and pm. The four key ﬁrst-order-conditions of the
model (for which we do have the appropriate quantity data) are given by equations (13)-
(16).4 Following Cole and Ohanian (2004) we can divide the left hand side of each ﬁrst
order condition by the corresponding right hand side to get a measure of the deviation of
that condition from the optimum. Thus, for each margin we get one wedge for each state
4We should note that there are two additional ﬁrst order conditions given by equations (6) and (5). Given
t h er e l a t i v ep r i c epa/pm we can use these two conditions to solve for
ˆ ya
ˆ ym.G i v e n y and ys, one can then
use the production function for ﬁnal goods to solve for ˆ ya and ˆ ym individually. Substituting these into the
balanced trade condition one can deduce the implicit values of transfers T = paTa +pmTm that would make
the national income accounting hold exactly.




































where i = West Bengal, Maharashtra. θ
l,as,i is the wedge in the optimality condition for
labor allocation between agriculture and services while θ
l,sm,i is the corresponding wedge in
the labor allocation between service and manufacturing sectors. Numbers less than one
for these wedges would indicate that the marginal product of labor in manufacturing is too
high. Note that the wedge in the optimal labor allocation condition between agriculture








l,i is the wedge in the optimal labor-leisure
condition with numbers less than one indicating that the marginal product of labor is higher
than the marginal disutility from labor.5 Lastly, θ
I,i is the wedge in the intertemporal Euler
equation with a number below one indicating that savings are sub-optimally low. Note
that since we do not have state-speciﬁc interest rate data, we have chosen to substitute the
marginal product of capital into the Euler equation (2). Hence, a test of whether or not
the Euler equation holds reduces to a joint test of the Euler equation and the ﬁrm’s optimal
capital conditions holding simultaneously.
Before proceeding further it is worth noting that the diﬀerence in output across states has
5Note that the measurement of the wedge in the optimal labor-leisure condition, θ
l,i, is itself sensitive
to the wedges in the inter-sectoral labor allocation conditions. Thus, if θ
l,sm,i is systematically diﬀerent
from unity then the measured θ
l,i would depend on whether we use the value marginal product of labor in
agriculture, manufacturing or services in the denominator of the expression for θ
l,i.
21to be attributable to either wedges in the ﬁrst order conditions or to productivity diﬀerences
between the states. If all the wedges were one then, by construction, per capita output
would be identical across the states. Alternatively, if there are no wedges in the ﬁrst order
conditions then the entire diﬀerence in per capita incomes between the states would be
attributed to the productivity diﬀerence alone. Crucially, in this event, there would be no
diﬀerence in the steady state levels of labor supply and capital per eﬃciency unit of labor,
k.T h e o n l y d i ﬀerence would be in the levels of the per capita variables and wages. On the
other hand, if there are wedges in one or more of the ﬁrst order conditions then the steady
state allocations of the staionary variables would be diﬀerent across the states.









¯ l 5000 hours
ψ 2.24
δ 0.04
Some of the our assumed parameter values need elaboration. The parameter values for
α,β and δ are standard. ψ and ¯ l are taken from Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004).
22We picked θ and γ, the shares of services and manufacturing in total output based on the
average shares of these sectors in total output in these two states during the period 1960-95.
The parameters µ and σ are more problematic since we don’t have any estimates of these to
go on. We chose these high numbers based on the notion that most of the input into the
agriculture and services sectors is labor time. Note that for a given output and labor input
in these two sectors, a higher value for the parameters µ and σ imply a lower estimated
number for productivity.
Figures 10-12 show the evolution of the two sectoral labor allocation wedges and the
Euler equation wedge respectively from 1960 to 1995. In all three pictures we measure the
state-speciﬁc wedges on he left axi and the relative wedge (measured as the ratio of the
wedge for West Bengal to Maharashtra) on the right axis. There are three key messages
that emerge from these ﬁgures. First, the wedge in the optimal labor allocation condition
between agriculture and sevices (Figure 10) behaved very similarly in the two states during
t h i sp e r i o d . T h i si sc l e a rf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tt h er e l a t i v ew e d g ei n1 9 9 5w a sa l m o s ti d e n t i c a lt o
its value in 1965. Thus, labor supply misallocation between agriculture and services is not a
factor in understanding the diﬀerences in aggregate output between the states.6 Second, the
wedge depicted in Figure 11 shows that the marginal product of labor in manufacturing was
too low relative to the services sector in both states. However, in Maharashtra by the end
of the period the wedge was approaching unity, i.e., it was approaching the optimal point.
In West Bengal on the other hand, the decline in the wege was nowhere near as sharp. As
a result starting from a relative wedge of one in 1960, the wedge in West Bengal was almost
6The fact that wedge for each state is signiﬁcantly lower than unity reﬂects a well known characteristic
of developing countries: the excess concentration of the workforce in agriculture. The key point here is that
this margin didn’t worsen during the period nor did it diﬀer across the two states.
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twice that in Maharashtra by 1995. Thus, low labor productivity in manufacturing appears
to have been an important part of the diﬀerential evolution of the states.7 Third, Figure 12
shows that the Euler equation held fairly well over this period since the investment wedge
was reasonably close to one for most of the time for both states. Note that in the light of
Footnote 6 above and the fact that the observed wedges in inter-sectoral labor allocations
are systematically diﬀerent from one, we ignore the measured labor wedge θ
l.
We next turn to the evolution of the sectoral productivity factors in the two states.
Figures 13-15 show the evolution of productivity measured in labor augmenting form in
agriculture, manufacturing and services sectors. As before we measure the state-speciﬁc
7Note that since the wedge in labor allocation between agriculture and services remained relatively stable
in both states while the wedge between services and manufacturing changed a lot, it follows that the wedge
between agriculture and manufacturing must also have changed appreciably during the period 1960-95 since
it is a ratio of the ﬁrst two wedges.
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25productivities on the left axis and the relative sectoral productivity of West Bengal on the
right axis. The ﬁgures reveal three basic facts. Agricultural productivity behaved very
similarly in the two states. Agriculture in West Bengal was more productive throughout
the period. However, the relative position didn’t change much during this period. If
anything, West Bengal’s productivity advantage was marginally eroded during this period.
The picture is quite diﬀerent in the manufacturing and services sectors. In manufacturing,
West Bengal’s productivity declined from 85% of Maharashtra in 1960 to about 45% by 1995.
The main factor driving the movement in relative productivity was a virtually stagnant
manufacturing productivity in West Bengal. Similarly in the services sector, West Bengal’s
relative productivity declined from about 90% of Maharashtra in 1960 to 60% in 1995.
The main driver of relative productivity in services was a sharp productivity pick-up in
Maharashtra starting in the late 1980s.
T h ed i a g n o s t i ce x e r c i s ea b o v er e v e a l st h r e ek e yf e a t u r e s . F i r s t ,d i ﬀerentials in labor-
augmenting productivity growth accounts for upwards of 2/3 of the relative decline in manu-
facturing and services sectors in West Bengal. Thus, about 2/3 of the decline in manufactur-
ing output of West Bengal relative to Maharashtra between 1960 and 1995 can be attributed
to productivity diﬀerences between the two states while the rest of the decline is attributable
to problems in the labor market. To see this note that relative productivity in West Bengal
fell by about 48% between 1960 and 1995. During the same period relative manufacturing
output declined by about 73%. Hence, productivity accounts for about 2/3 (= 48/73) of the
decline in relative manufacturing output while labor market problems account for the rest.
Similarly, in the services sector, relative output in West Bengal fell about 45% between 1960
and 1995 while relative productivity declined by about 31%. Hence, productivity accounts
for about 70% of the relative decline in the services sector in West Bengal during this period
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28while factor market distortions account for the rest.
Second, relative to Maharashtra, there were some systematic factors in West Bengal
which kept the marginal product of labor in manufacturing too low. Hence, labor market
distortions speciﬁc to the manufacturing sector may have been a contributing factor.
Third, the agricultural sector reveals a picture very diﬀerent from the other two sectors.
While relative agricultural productivity in West Bengal declined about 7% between 1960
and 1995, relative agricultural output actually increased about 18% during the period. This
expansion was accounted for by a 30% increase in relative agricultural employment in West
Bengal. Hence, there appear to have been some pro-agricultural labor force factors in play
during this period.
4 Proximate Explanations
Having described the economic dynamics in the two states, we now turn to studying the
potential explanations for the observed disparity between the West Bengal and Maharashtra.
In this we will be guided by the diagnostic exercises carried out above. Of particular interest
to us is to identify factors speciﬁc to West Bengal that could have simultaneously depressed
total factor productivity in manufacturing and services, reduced the marginal product of
labor in manufacturing, and increased incentives for labor employed in agricultural in the
state. The usual practise in exercises like these is to look for speciﬁcp o l i c i e st h a tc o u l dh a v e
caused these outcomes. The complicating factor here is the compulsion of electoral politics
in India. The strong socialistic bent of the country since gaining independence from Britain
in 1947 has caused political parties across most of the ideological spectrum to converge on a
similar set of stated economic policy goals. These stated goals typically include being pro-
labor, pro-rural, pro-agriculture, pro-small scale industries, etc. Hence, examining stated
29policies across states in India often doesn’t reveal the true picture. Thus, even though
Besley and Burgess (2003) found that West Bengal was the state with the highest number
of pro-labor changes in labor regulations, they ended up classifying both West Bengal and
Maharashtra as being pro-labor. Rather, in our opinion, the key diﬀerence across states
is the implementation record: which policies are implemented and how rigorously are they
implemented. But this is precisely what makes the mapping between policies and outcomes
hard.
In order to make some progress on understanding the diﬀerent outcomes between West
Bengal and Maharashtra, we start by describing the political history of these two states.
With the exception of some brief interludes, between 1960 and 1995 Maharashtra was gov-
erned almost throughout by the Congress party.8 The Congress party was also the ruling
party at the federal level during most of this period. The prevailing ideology of the Congress
party was socialism with a strong belief in the paternalistic role of the state, self-reliance,
infant industry protection etc.. Till 1977, West Bengal’s political hsitory reads very much
like Maharashtra’s with the state being ruled almost throught by the Congress party (ex-
cept for a short two year interlude between 1969 and 1971 when a leftist coalition called
the United Front ruled the state government). However, since 1977 West Bengal has been
governed uninterrupted by a leftist coalition called the Left Front led by the Communist
Party of India (Marxist) making it the longest running government in the country. It is
i n s t r u c t i v et on o t et h a tt h el e f t i s tv o t es h a r ei nW e s tB e n g a lg r e wr a p i d l yf r o m1 8p e r c e n t
8Thus, for two years between 1978 and 1980, Maharashtra had a government led by the Janata party
which was itself a coalition of smaller parties with similar political ideologies to the Congress. In fact,
a number of the leading politicians associated with the Janata party were themselves ex-Congress party
members.
30in 1951 to 32 percent in 1962 to 46 percent in 1971 to 49 percent in 1995.
Since the Leftist political parties are the biggest supporters of labor and the rural poor,
one candidate explanation for the diﬀerential performance between the two states is that the
politics of West Bengal caused it. It is important to reiterate that despite the similarity
between the stated political and economic objectives of both the leftist parties as well as the
socialism oriented Congres party, there may well be a diﬀerence in policy implementation
between a government run by a party that courts labor votes and a government that is run
by labor interests itself. We assess the potential of this margin by examining the interaction
o ft h ep o l i t i c a lp o w e ro ft h el e f tw i t ht h ew e d g e st h a tw ei d e n t i ﬁed above.
In Figures 16 and 17 we plot the vote share of the Leftist parties in West Bengal along
with the two labor allocation wedges involving the manufacturing sector: agriculture to
manufacturing, and services to manufacturing. The correlation of the vote share with the
two wedges is 0.34 and 0.51 respectively.9 We chose not to plot the vote share with the
agriculture/services labor allocation wedge and with the savings (Euler equation) wedge
since we have already seen that these two wedges did not show much movement during the
period under study.
In Figures 18, 19 and 20 we plot the Leftist vote share against the productivity wedges
in agriculture, manufacturing and services sectors in West Bengal (relative to Maharashtra).
9The leftist vote share is deﬁned as the combined vote share in local Assembly elections of the following
parties: Communist Party of India, Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), Communist Party of
India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation), Communist Party of India (Marxist), Forward Block, Forward Block
(Socialist), Farward Block, Forward Block (MG), Forward Block (RG), Forward Block (Marxist), Revolu-
tionary Socialist Party. We have data for the Assembly elections in 1951, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1972,
1977, 1982, 1987, 1991, 1996, and 2001. We generated an annual series for the vote share by ﬁlling in for
the years between elections using the average annual growth rate of the share between successive elections.
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All three ﬁgures show a strong negative relationship between the vote share and the wedges
with correlations of -0.44, -0.49 and -0.55, respectively. Cearly, leftist votes didn’t trans-
lates into productivity gains in general. The only nuancing to the picture comes from the
agricultural sector where since 1977 there has been a slight gain in productivity. This is
noteworthy as the Left Front (the leftist coaltion came to power in 1977. However, relative
agricultural productivity in West Bengal 1995 was still lower than in 1960 despite these
productivity gains in the last eighteen years of our sample period.
G i v e nt h ep a t t e r no fc o m o v e m e n tb e t w e e nt h el e f t i s tv o t es h a r ea n dt h ed i ﬀerent wedges
in West Bengal, the obvious next step is to determine what exactly happened in response to
the growing political strength of the left. The ﬁrst suspect is that an increasing leftist vote
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share may have been accompanied by rising bargaining power of the trade unions. This
may have induced more aggressive trade union demands for higher wages, more labor-friendly
work rules etc.. To examine this possibility, in Figure 21 we look at the ratio of mandays
lost to mandays worked in West Bengal and Maharashtra between 1960 and 1995. The
ﬁgure is revealing. The level of industrial action in the two states was almost identical
till 1966. Starting in 1967 there was a sharp spike in industrial action in West Bengal.
Thereafter the mandays lost ratio in West Bengal was always higher than in Maharashtra
(with the exception of one year, 1982, which saw a brutal strike in Maharashtra). During
the period the mean for the mandays lost ratio in West Bengal was almost three times that
in Maharashtra.10
The fact that days lost due to industrial action in West Bengal started rising in the late
10To put these numbers in perspective, it is worth noting that Maharashtra was not exactly a state with
a particularly docile labor force. The level of trade union power in the textile industry in Maharashtra was
extremely high with some of the state trade union leaders like Mr. Datta Samant having a national proﬁle.
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1960s is interesting as that was precisely the time that the leftist coalition ﬁrst came to
power in the state, albeit for a short perod of time. In 22 we plot the leftist vote share
against the ratio of mandays lost to mandaysw o r k e di nW e s tB e n g a l . A si so b v i o u s ,t h e
more powerful the left became the greater was the incidence of labor action, strikes etc. —
the correlation between the leftist vote share and mandays lost ratio is 0.59. Another sign of
increasing labor power in West Bengal during this period was rapid expansion in the number
of registered trade unions in West Bengal from 2057 in 1957 to 4808 in 1970, i.e., a 2.5 fold
rise. During the same period the number of registered trade unions in Maharashtra only
increased from 1586 to 2560.11
Before concluding this section we want to brieﬂy examine a political economy argument
t h a tm a yb em a d et oe x p l a i nt h ed i ﬀerence between the two states. The political economy
argument would hold that a key ingredient in the development path of a state is the provision
11Unfortunately, our data on trade unions in West Bengal does not extend beyond 1970.
36of public capital in the form of economic and social infrastructure. While this development
expenditure is determined by state governments, they are often at the mercy of the federal
government for the allocation of funds.12 In particular, a state with a government headed by
ap a r t yd i ﬀerent from the party in power at the federal level would be in a disadvantageous
position. West Bengal has been ruled by a coalition of Leftist parties for the last 27 years.
These parties have never been in power or even shared power at the federal level (except for
two very brief periods totaling about ﬁve years). Thus, due to its political leanings, West
Bengal may have been starved for funds with which it could ﬁnance development spending.
To investigate the potential of this argument, Figure 23 plots development spending in West
Bengal relative to Maharashtra.13 As is obvious from the graph, there is hardly any variation
in development expenditure across the two states during this period. Hence this explanation
cannot account for the disparity in economic performance between the two states.
While Figure 23 shows that the development spending by the respective state govern-
ments was roughly similar, it may still be the case that the federal government discriminated
against West Bengal by underproviding federally funded infrastructure in the state. One
12In India a large part of the budgetary funds comes from the states’ share of national tax revenues. The
speciﬁc share is determined by a binding recommendation of the Finance Commission. However, a second
key component of any state budget is the allocation of discretionary funds to the states from the federal
government. This component is distinct from the statutory component.
13Development expenditure is deﬁned as expenditure (on the Revenue account) on economic and social
services by state governments. The economic services include agriculture and allied activities, rural devel-
opment, special area programs, irrigation and ﬂood control, energy, industry and minerals, transport and
communications, science, technology and environment. The social services include education, medical and
public health, family welfare, water supply and sanitation, housing, urban development, labor and labor
welfare, social security and welfare, nutrition, relief on account of natural calamities. This series is available
from the World Bank dataset on Poverty in India: http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/data/indiapaper.htm
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measure of federally funded infrastructure is the national highway network. In Figure 24
we plot the kilometers of national highways in West Bengal relative to Maharashtra. Once
again, the ﬁgure makes clear that there is not much variation in this ratio during this period.
Hence, this argument doesn’t appear to be very compelling either.
5 Some ancillary considerations
The sustained rule over the last twenty seven years by a leftist coalition in West Bengal raises
a couple of other potential issues. First, did it have any impact on the human capital stock
in West Bengal? If so, what implication does it have for our productivity decompositions?
We address this issue by constructing state speciﬁc human capital stocks using the Mincer
wage regressions. Our education data comes from the Indian census data. Figure 25 shows
the constructed human capital stocks for Maharashtra, West Bengal and India as a whole.
The ﬁgure makes clear that in terms of the human capital stocks there wasn’t a big change
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during this period. Maharashtra started out marginally ahead and ended marginally ahead.
Given that the relative human capital stock in West Bengal didn’t change much during the
period suggests that our productivity decompositions are robust to controlling for human
capital.
However, this aggregate measure of the stock of human capital masks considerable varia-
tion in educational attainment by age group. This issue is particularly relevant on because
a key component of the leftist philosophy in West Bengal was equalization of education op-
portunities. One of the methods adopted to achieve this goal was to move faculty from
traditional centres of academic excellence to other institutions spread around the state in
order to equalize the quality of educational institutions. The eﬀect of this policy can be seen
in the three ﬁgures shown below. In these ﬁg u r e sw ed e p i c tt h es h a r eo ft h ep o p u l a t i o nb y
age group with graduate and post-graduate degrees in West Bengal relative to Maharashtra.
As these ﬁgures make clear, the eﬀe c to ft h el e f t i s te d u c a t i o n a lp o l i c i e sh a v eb e e nu n a m -
39Figure 25: Human capital stocks





















biguously devastating. In all three categories, West Bengal has seen a systematic decline in
relative educational attainment. In almost all age-groups and degrees, West Bengal’s share
of graduates has declined. The eﬀect is probably most dramatic in the 20-24 age group
where the decline has been the most precipitous. Given that this 20-24 age group is going
to be the primary work force over the next thirty years, it suggests that worker productivity
may stay sluggish for a while even if investment in physical capital picks up in the coming
years.
A second issue relates to the eﬀect of pro-labor leftist government on poverty or inequality
within West Bengal. Thus, it could be argued that while the main social beneﬁt of leftist
political power and policies are in these social statistics of development rather than in income.
We have already seen that in terms of education and humanc capital stocks, West Bengal












































Population Share of Persons with Graduate Degrees: 
West Bengal Relative to Maharashtra
1961 vs 1991, by Age Group
*population share=number of persons with graduate degrees in age group i/total population of age group i.
1961
1991
Source: Census of India, 1961 and 1991
Figure 27: Population with post-graduate degrees
Population Share* of Persons with Post-Graduate Degrees: 
West Bengal Relative to Maharashtra












































*population share=number of persons with post-graduate degrees in age group i/total population of age group i.
1961
1991
Source: Census of India, 1961 and 1991
41Figure 28: Population with technical degrees
Population Share* of Persons with Technical Degrees**: 
West Bengal Relative to Maharashtra
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Source: Census of India, 1961 and 1991
showed no relative improvement during the period 1960-95. In Figure 29 we plot the
evloution of the rural and urban headcount index in West Bengal relative to Maharashtra.
This index measures the fraction of the population whose income is below the poverty line.
It is clear that that while West Bengal starts out with lower poverty incidence in both rural
and urban areas, there is not much improvement in either during this period (relative to
Maharashtra). In both rural and urban areas of Bengal, relative poverty incidence worsened
between 1960 and 1980 and then started improving thereafter. But over the entire period,
there wasn’t much change.
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436C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have contrasted the development paths of two Indian states, West Bengal
and Maharashtra, between 1960 and 1995. Starting from an initial position more or less
identical to Maharashtra, West Bengal’s relative income had dropped to about 60 percent
of Maharashtra by 1995. Our diagnostic tests on the model suggest that while productivity
diﬀerences can account for about 2/3 of the gap between the states, the rest is likely to be due
to problems in the labor market in West Bengal. In particular, there appear to have been
some factor(s) that raised wages in West Bengal above the levels dictated by the neoclassical
growth model’s ﬁrst order conditions. The strong correlations of our estimated labor market
and productivity wedges with the vote share of the Leftist parties in West Bengal suggest
that increasing labor power during this period in West Bengal may have been the proximate
cause of the diverging economic performance of the two states.
While the diagnostic exercises in the paper suggest that the problems are likely to be in
the labor market, in order to assess the quantitative importance of this margin one needs
to formalize and quantify a political-economy model in which declining investment and out-
put can coexist with rising labor power for relatively sustained periods of time in a voting
environment. This is the subject of our future work in this area.
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